The NIST contest has not been the only government-led effort to discover qunatum-resistant algorithms. In this episode we describe South Korea's PQC contest, which is entirely independent of the NIST contest.
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Jason has 20 years of experience researching, innovating, educating markets, developing intellectual property, and contributing to national-level guidance and consortium standards. He works closely with enterprise companies daily to synthesize managed PKI security solutions that meet real-world operational needs.
Jason Soroko is a seasoned security technology innovator and Senior Fellow at Sectigo, where he leads customer-facing engagements, drives research, and spearheads strategic initiatives at both organizational and national levels. He also contributes to the development of intellectual property and consortium standards. As co-host of the award-winning “Root Causes” podcast, Jason educates professionals on the latest trends in PKI and cybersecurity twice a week. His core strength is bridging cutting-edge security methods with real-world operational needs, ensuring that businesses are equipped with practical, forward-thinking solutions.
Recent posts by Jason Soroko
In this second of two episodes, we finish our discussion of Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computers (SRQC) and their implications.
We define a new term, Quantum Security Posture Management (QSPM) and explain what it is and why it's important for PQC plans.
In this first of two episodes, we discuss the expected scientific applications for quantum computing architecture and the idea of a Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computer (SRQC).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is supposed to be this highly secure method of key exchange. But is it as secure as people say? We explore the potential weaknesses with QKD.
We follow up on the recent Mythos attack against PQC candidate HAWK. We discuss the impact of this attack on both HAWK and FALCON.
TLS certificates from CA/Browser Forum CAs are not the only server certificates in the WebPKI. eIDAS QWACs are treated as server certificates by the major browsers. We see clear progress toward post quantum cryptography (PQC) for TLS by way of the Merkle Tree Certificate (MTC) architecture. But what is the path to PQC for eIDAS? We examine this question.
As certificate lifespans become extremely short, new methods of delivery become functionally necessary. We explain RFC 9345 and how delegated credentials play a role in CDNs to deliver very short-lived certificates.
With certificate lifespans shortening, we occasionally run into those who disagree with this trend and seek to lengthen maximum term once again. We examine regressive attitudes in PKI, why they occur, and the reasons that lessening security is generally a bad policy.