Microsoft has publicly stated that it will hand over Bitlocker keys to US law enforcement agencies without requiring a subpoena or court order.
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We usually think of Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) as a security category. But we could equally well call it an operations category that enables uptime.
We introduce the concept of a "digital parasite," explaining why this attack philosophy appears to be on the rise.
In a recent blog post Google made five recommendations for policy makers.
CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) has released new guidance about post-quantum cryptography in critical infrastructure, including some sobering warnings.
CAA records exist to restrict issuing CAs for a given domain to as few as one CA. But what happens when the CAA record outlives the CA?
Chrome's deadline for deprecation of the clientAuth EKU and mTLS in public certificates has moved out. We give you the what, when, and why.
Root Causes 589: Is a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer Economically Viable?
We recently heard the argument that it's simply too expensive to develop a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. We vehemently disagree. In this episode we explain why.
The transition to PQC is not just a change in cryptographic algorithms but also a fundamental shift in how we treat our cryptography. From here on out, IT systems need to be fundamentally crypto agile as never before.
It would be easy to believe that the amount of risk posed to the WebPKI by any individual public CA is somehow proportional to the number of active certificates that CA has. This is false, however. In this episode we address this misconception.
Jason describes a recent intrusion almost entirely operated by off-the-shelf AI tools. This is an important milestone in security. We describe its potential consequences.
We expand on the concept of trust-now-forge-later to list a whole bevy of additional attacks that eventually will be enabled by cryptographically relevant quantum computers.