Podcast
Root Causes 55: California's New IoT Security Law
Hosted by
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Original broadcast date
December 5, 2019
California Senate Bill 327 (SB-327) goes into effect January 1, 2020. This groundbreaking ordinance requires basic security measures for devices deployed in California. Join us to learn what SB-327 requires from device manufacturers, which threats it protects against, and how this ordinance is leading the way toward stronger IoT security practices.
Podcast transcript
Lightly edited for flow and brevity.
TCTim CallanSo, today, we are going to talk about California Senate Bill 327, which is California’s IoT Security Law.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanI bet you do.
TCTim CallanYeah, I think you are right. So, let's cover those facts and figures and then we can get into it. So, Senate Bill 327, the title of it is Security of Connected Devices. It was signed into law on September 28th, 2018, which is why it has the honor of being the first, because this was all the way back last year, more than a year ago that this was signed in and it goes into effect on January 1, 2020, and that's why we're making sure that we touch base on it now because you know, it is going into effect pretty soon. And then it's going to start to really matter. And you're correct - - this is a California law and as such, it has no power for enforcement outside of the state of California. But to your point, the general consensus is that for most use cases, for most devices and business models, it's probably easier to follow this law everywhere than it is to keep a close eye on what inventory is going into California and what inventory is going out of California. So, with probably few exceptions, what'll happen, is this will, have the force to make devices throughout the US or even beyond be compliant with the principles of this law.
TCTim CallanExactly. It's just not worth it. So, what is it? Before we get into the commentary what does it say? So, the security that is required by the law is that the manufacturer - - and this is a direct quote, “shall equip the device with a reasonable security feature or features”, and those will follow three criteria. The first one is that it's appropriate to the nature and function of the device. Second of all, it's, that's appropriate to the information collected or used. So, there's a point here about maybe the information is valueless or maybe it's, you know, very damaging and then finally, it will protect from unauthorized access, destruction, use modifications or disclosure. And then it goes on to describe these reasonable security features as, either a pre-programmed password unique to each device or a password that the user can change to make their own. So, what this really gets around is number one, devices with no password - which is really a thing, believe it or not. And number two, is devices that all have the exact same either password or shared secret that cannot be changed.
TCTim CallanYes. So, give us a very brief reminder for the listeners about why the Mirai Botnet was so major. Right? When the Mirai Botnet came out, it was just earth shattering, they were doing - - they were DDoSing things that people thought were un-DDoSable and it was like this real eye-opener. So, the Mirai Bonet was huge in that these things were getting services were getting DDoSed that people thought were un-DDoSable essentially. And it's because so much power was being directed against them that nobody had ever seen a botnet with that much power before. And that was the Mirai Botnet. And, why was it that the Mirai Botnet in particular was so much more - - just had so much more strength than anything we'd seen before?
Yeah, Tim. So, the idea of the Mirai Botnet was fundamentally the reason why it worked - - the root cause of why the bad guys were able to harvest so many millions of these devices really came down to these static credentials. Credentials that either were very easy to guess because perhaps they were published or they were known. Perhaps there might have even been a mechanism to change the administrator’s user name and password to authenticate to these devices. Problem is the users of these devices didn't change them. So keep in mind, all this legislation is calling for is a mechanism to change hard-coded static credentials. That is all that the legislation is calling for at this point. It's not even asking for encrypted communication tunnels, TLS mutual authentication. It's not calling for any of that. It really is just that mechanism to change a default username and password, for example.
TCTim CallanYeah. And the reason that this I think is necessary is that the victims of these botnets are not necessarily the people who use these devices and certainly not the people who sell these devices and so, there wasn't a built-in economic mechanism to solve this, right? If I'm giving you something that's very sensitive and you're going to store your sensitive, personal information on it or it's going to do things that might compromise your safety, if it's a car or a home burglar alarm or something along those lines, then there's a built-in economic incentive for it to be secure. You as the purchaser want it to be secure. The manufacturer wants it to be secure or someone wants it. In this case, you were talking about closed circuit televisions or cameras, right? Nobody was worried about it. So, if somebody steals video of the parking lot do you really care? And so, as a consequence, there wasn't that built-in mechanism and what happened was these devices were used to harm other people who were not in that purchase and use chain in any way. And so, the legislation puts a requirement on people to provide that minimum level of security.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanThat's right. Cause the static username and password thing obviously was a big glaring problem, but is far from all of the problems. I'm trying to think of an analogy - - It's like, you know, if you have a car that doesn't have any brakes and also it might spontaneously burst into flames, it's like you got the brakes fixed and so I guess that is good but you might still die. Um, and so this is a similar situation. There was a lot of other things that really need to be rectified as well and the California bill, though positive, only rectifies one of those things.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanYeah. And we've talked in the past about how some jurisdictions are kind of bellwethers. We've mentioned Texas and energy. We've mentioned Germany and consumer privacy. I think California you could argue is well-equipped to be a first mover in this kind of legislation for something like IoT, just with the state's history with devices of these sorts and companies of these sorts. It's not really surprising to see that state move first. Also, the victims are likely to be in California or as likely to be in California as to be in anywhere that people are hurt by these botnets. So, when you put all of that together, it's not surprising to see California was a first mover. I think it was real valuable for California to be that. It does look like the federal legislation, should it go into effect, will almost render the California legislation irrelevant.
TCTim CallanYeah. And so, you know, it's good to say that they have to have passwords and they need to be changeable or unique, but obviously, you and I think that identity on devices - - like there's still a lot of weaknesses right. The obvious one is what if you don't change the password. So, if you give people a device and you give them the ability to change the password and 98% of them don't do it, then that's only 2% better than not having that ability in the first place.
TCTim CallanRight.
TCTim CallanYeah. And then even then, um, even if they do change their password, you still, depending on the device and the type of attack, you still get into the fact that passwords themselves are not the strongest form of authentication, right? If I can steal your password, if I can social engineer away your password, then I can still gain access to your device. And again, depending on the type of the IoT device that could be really damaging. So—
TCTim CallanRight.
TCTim CallanRight.
TCTim CallanSure. Yeah. And, um, and that's great. Right? I'm - - I want to make sure I'm clear that I'm totally in favor of that. I think you're right where I was going though is we need to be thinking about more than just that.
TCTim CallanGreat and so, of course, probably it is a PKI podcasts, and we're probably not surprising that you and I are both of the opinion that PKI is a really, really, really good way to handle identity for devices.
TCTim CallanYeah and, you know, and so yeah, if you want to be compliant, it absolutely helps with the compliance need. It also helps tremendously just with the security of your devices. So, again, if we're talking about, you know, yeah, sure if it's a bunch of CCTV cameras or baby monitors or something else where you kind of say, eh, what's somebody going to really do with this, I don't really care, then maybe what you really care about is compliance, but you can move into lots and lots of device types where we care very deeply about ensuring the integrity of our devices, or we might get hurt. Right? And you and I have talked about that in the past, that could be process control meters and things along those lines and so under those circumstances, you know, you have the added benefit of something like this, that you, it is just plain more the secure.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanYeah, exactly. And it's sort of like, uh, you know, there's something very specific that I want this thing to do and you know, when I spec it, that's, that's what I focus on and then people go and they source parts and they put something together that does that specific thing and they QA and passes the spec and you go, okay, it's fine and you put it into the world and nobody ever considered this requirement. And that's what this law changes, right? Now it becomes a requirement that every product manager, when they're specifying a product like this, and they want to sell it in California, they don't want to pay penalties, they are going to work on this particular element of it and in that sense, it's good.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanGreat. So that's it. It's California Senate Bill 327. It goes into effect on January 1. It will be, um, it definitely is important and as we said, other legislation supersede it but for the moment it is on the cutting edge and it definitely will change the world of device manufacturing. So, very exciting stuff. It's good to see some positive progress and as always, thank you for your insights, Jay.
TCTim CallanYou bet we will. And thank you, Listeners. This has been Root Causes.