The NIST contest has not been the only government-led effort to discover qunatum-resistant algorithms. In this episode we describe South Korea's PQC contest, which is entirely independent of the NIST contest.
Tim Callan
Tim Callan has over 20 years of experience in the SSL and PKI technology spaces. Tim leads Sectigo's conformance with industry and regulatory requirements including browser root programs, WebTrust, CA/Browser Forum, and more. Tim is instrumental in driving initiatives to improve certificate agility and successful issuance. A founding member of the CA/Browser Forum and current vice-chair for one of its working groups, Tim is creator and co-host of Root Causes: A PKI and Security Podcast, the world’s most popular podcast dedicated to digital certificates. With 400+ episodes published, Tim is on the forefront of explaining trends that will be essential to the IT professionals, including shortening certificate lifespans and the coming change to post-quantum cryptography.
Recent posts by Tim Callan
In this second of two episodes, we finish our discussion of Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computers (SRQC) and their implications.
We define a new term, Quantum Security Posture Management (QSPM) and explain what it is and why it's important for PQC plans.
In this first of two episodes, we discuss the expected scientific applications for quantum computing architecture and the idea of a Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computer (SRQC).
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is supposed to be this highly secure method of key exchange. But is it as secure as people say? We explore the potential weaknesses with QKD.
Join us for a practical session on what's breaking, why it's breaking, and how to get ahead of the next stepdown before it hits. We’re exposing gaps in certificate inventories, ownership and DCV workflows, and we’ll cover the real cost of manual renewal cycles, how automation takes away the burden, and how to turn this renewal surge into a dry run for 100-day certificates.
We follow up on the recent Mythos attack against PQC candidate HAWK. We discuss the impact of this attack on both HAWK and FALCON.
TLS certificates from CA/Browser Forum CAs are not the only server certificates in the WebPKI. eIDAS QWACs are treated as server certificates by the major browsers. We see clear progress toward post quantum cryptography (PQC) for TLS by way of the Merkle Tree Certificate (MTC) architecture. But what is the path to PQC for eIDAS? We examine this question.
As certificate lifespans become extremely short, new methods of delivery become functionally necessary. We explain RFC 9345 and how delegated credentials play a role in CDNs to deliver very short-lived certificates.
