Podcast
Root Causes 477: Comparative Security Philosophies


Hosted by
Tim Callan
Chief Compliance Officer
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Original broadcast date
March 13, 2025
We discuss how various popular computing platforms approach security and highlight the differences between them.
Podcast Transcript
Lightly edited for flow and brevity.
So let's start with Apple. It's got the walled garden. That's what kind of characterizes Apple. It's funny how I can be across my phone, my tablet, my MacBook, and my God, it's just seamless. Emphasis on user experience, and it's good, really good in that way. There's always a downside to something, and that is, well, I do not have the kind of freedom on an Apple device that I do - especially if it's not jail broken. If it’s straight up vanilla iOS, then, like, I can't write something that will go into the Apple App Store that will redirect SMS messages as an example. You could do that in Google, Android, all day long, but, and with Apple, no. The other thing is, like, things about like, when you download from the App Store, they do an awful lot of scrutiny and don't rely on things like a manifest. In other words, Apple has done a really nice job of saying, well, this app is going to ask for your camera rights, but you can choose. That's something that both iOS and Android now have in modern times. But the bottom line is, Apple makes a lot of their own decisions about what can and can’t happen.
Linux. Let's talk about Linux. It's everywhere. It's on desktops. It's on servers. It's in IoT devices and various distributions of it can make it sing and dance and do all kinds of things. Well, from a security standpoint, straight up vanilla versions of Linux are typically, like talk about choose your own adventure. That takes it to the absolute max. So not surprising that Android itself is a Linux-based fork, if you will. Linux itself is all about user autonomy. Therefore, the amazing thing about Linux is the transparency. Like the ability to enumerate, hey, what has credentials and rights to certain files? Like, my goodness, Linux has that in depth and in spades, and in fact, it can be overwhelming unless you're well trained in Linux to fully understand its security capabilities. Absolutely amazing. But this user autonomy comes with this such a rich customization environment that that's perhaps its strength and its weakness in that unless you really know what you're doing, you could probably never configure it right. If you do know what you're doing, you can probably configure that thing so tight it's truly, truly walled off from the world and super secure. It's hard to do, though. Like it takes work. Takes training, takes know how. So what I would say that it's not about, oh, well, the risk of malware, the risk of the freedom limiting. It's the opposite of all those things. I would say that the risk of misconfiguration is a big problem in general Linux distributions.
Let's talk about something that's not necessarily an operating system, but I bet you to the average person it kind of acts like an operating system, and that's everything Meta does. It’s like Meta as a whole.
Here's where I want to land. Thank you for that. That was really, really good. I want to land on this, this idea, and it's going to come from my notes.
So because of that gigantic attack service, Microsoft has to draw some lines somewhere about what it will protect, what it will write a patch for, what it will immediately remediate. In fact, they do have a page where they define exactly what they will and will not do. A lot of people don't know about this page. This is one of the few podcasts where we're actually make little bit of show notes, and I'll provide that link. It's worth reading. Really what prompted this particular podcast was a recent White Hat research where a White Hat researcher who was successful in causing a Windows update that would cause a downgrade attack. In other words, some form of security was downgraded, and therefore an attack was possible. It required a colonel level attack. Now, Microsoft did not patch this or remediate it in fast action. And part of the reasoning was, well, it does not cross a service boundary. That's their words.
You trust a completely wide open system. A system that was designed to be wide open. And you think it's Fort Knox, and you're making an error. That’s it.

