Podcast
Root Causes 455: PQC Standardization in IETF
Hosted by
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Original broadcast date
January 10, 2025
We talk with guest Sofia Celi of Brave Browser, who leads the IETF PQC standardization effort, about the process of setting standards for PQC-compatible digital certificates. We learn about expected timelines, hybrid strategies, the NIST PQC onramp's role, and more.
Podcast transcript
Lightly edited for flow and brevity.
TCTim CallanThrilled to be having a guest. I always like having guests, and I'm especially thrilled because this guest we've been trying to get on the episode for what maybe like, nine months. Before you answer that, let me introduce Sofía Celi. Sofía, welcome.
TCTim CallanI think it's been like nine months we've been trying to get you on this show. You do a lot of things, and I don't want to list all of them. Maybe in a future episode if we have you back, but a couple things I think that are relevant to us today. First of all, is, you are a cryptographer for the Brave browser. In addition to that, I know you chair several working groups in IETF, including the postquantum cryptography working group. Tell us about that.
TCTim CallanLike I said, you do a lot of things. I'd love to focus today and correct me if you don't think this is right, but I believe that it is. That there's kind of a cascading protocols and standards process. Where first we had to get those FIPS protocols out of NIST. We had to have the contest. We had to get the winners. We had to convert those into FIPS protocols. That needs to be turned into certificate protocols and communication protocols, which we will do through IETF, and then that can flow down to other bodies, one of which is CA/Browser Forum, not the only one, in order - ETSI is another one - in order to build their own standards. Am I articulating that correctly?
And then that is true that eventually, once they became a standard that is also already incorporated in the protocols that secure the transport of the internet, then what happens is that a lot of companies and a lot of organizations adopt those standards and push them. Either the big CDNs and kind of the server side of the things will adopt them, and also on the client side, the browsers will start also adopting them, and, of course, all of the parallel organizations that exist to them, which is like the certificate management, key management, even like UI concerns. There's like a lot of places that eventually the internet will touch.
TCTim CallanYou guys are critical to the rollout of PQC. Like, in a realistic way, we need the work that IETF does to roll out PQC. And this isn't me buttering you up. This is me leading up to a question which is, what is IETF up to in this regard? Where does it stand? What are the plans? When are we going to see them? What are you guys doing?
For example, one of the biggest drafts that we currently have at the TLS Working Group, which is how to add a KEM into the key exchange of the TLS 1.3 protocol. That draft has existed for like years now, so we were almost on par, but we were still waiting for NIST to get the final decision on who the winners were and actually publish a set of standards in order to also make those drafts and RFCs.
At the moment what is happening is that because those drafts already exist there and have been packed for a while, what is currently happening is that now we're actually trying to transform it into proper RFC so people could use them. There's a bunch of drafts currently. There's a lot of them, the TLS working group. There's some at the MLS working group. There's one at the ACME working group. There's a lot of working groups that have already like starting preparing. The focus has been mostly to focus on the confidentiality parts of the protocols. The ways in which we establish as share security is the one that we are putting our focus the most on, because we consider that that could be, that there's like a concrete attack against the confidentiality part.
Someone can harvest now and decrypt later. There has been less of a focus on the authentication part. Though I do think that next year we will see the rise of the authentication part, mostly because actually, two weeks ago or three weeks ago, Amazon actually published that they are going to be issuing certificates for the internal, private CA with MLDS. That means that the industry is already trying to issue these certificates, even for the private use cases. This is a private CA, but that already like signals that there’s interest into actually experimenting and deploying the authentication part.
TCTim CallanThere's a bunch of directions we can branch from this. I want to grab that last bit that you just said, and maybe we will return to some of the other ones but it's interesting you bring this up. We see pre-standards, homegrown, walled garden implementations from technology leaders. Amazon is not the first. I think Cloudflare was the first I became aware of where they just sort of said, none of this has worked out, but we control both ends, we're just going to make something, and we'll change it later if we have to. How do you feel about that stuff? As somebody who makes standards. Is this good? Is this bad?
There was a really early experiment that was launched between Cloudflare and Google Chrome in 2016, I think, that showed that it was feasible to put like a hybrid key exchange. I think they use an isogeny one plus like an elliptic curve algorithm. And it showed that it was okay, that nothing really broke. There was some impacts on the round trip at the TCP layer, and there was some middle boxes that couldn't handle, but it was something that we could solve. And we saw that quite a lot for the key exchange part. For the confidentiality part, there were a bunch of experiments performed by a lot of companies. There were also similar experiments done by Amazon, but we saw that less with the authentication part, because it's really difficult to have these emulated experiments, because you will have to have a way to issue these certificates, and we will have to do a coordinated experiment between public CAs and the server and the client. That's much more difficult to launch, but it's great to see this experimentation and it’s exciting, at least from Amazon, from a private CA even when they are both controlling the endpoint, because if they succeed and they showed us that there was nothing that really went terribly wrong, then that means that maybe the public CAs will be able to start migrating, because now we have the assurances from the experimentation and actual data and actual numbers that show us that everything was fine.
TCTim CallanI get it. Real world, just real world data are always valuable. You said there are a lot of drafts in draft form right now, in production right now, and in particular, that you guys are focused much more on the KEM, ML-KEM side of thing than the signature side of thing. Are we therefore expecting to see standards actually come out in stages? Like are we expecting to see a standard for key exchange before we get a standard for digital signatures?
TCTim CallanI'm just gonna put you on the spot. When are we expecting to see a standard for TLS key exchange?
TCTim CallanWhen do you think in 2025? That's a lot of range.
TCTim CallanWe’re shooting for this year, but we're really shooting for the end of this year.
TCTim CallanThis is something really big you're saying now. I want to make sure I'm understanding this right. You're saying that it is not yet determined whether or not a hybrid standard will be offered for TLS.
TCTim CallanI might have two options. I might be able to use a hybrid implementation or a pure PQC implementation. Then of course, from there, people can then proceed to offer hybrid certificates and pure PQC certificate. Presumably. Does all of that get yoked into the November release, or is it possible that that winds up being more kind of staged releases over time to get through those?
TCTim CallanAre there any road blockers or sources of worry? Do you feel good that this will eventually get done and it's just got to get done, or are there risks involved in all of this?
On the authentication part on the contrary, and the reason why I think it has been delayed is both because it's much more difficult to migrate the authentication systems. You have to coordinate with the different Certificate Authorities. You have to come up with a way to expire this now all certificates which were always horrible, horribly done how we expire certificates. We have to coordinate with a lot of parties, and also the majority of the signature algorithms that have been proposed to standardize by NIST do have some public key sizes that are much longer when compared with the classical counterparts. We still don't know, because we send so many signatures, for example, at a TLS layer. I think we send six signatures in a handshake. Because we send so much the impact of the signature at the authentication level is much more felt than at the key exchange level.
TCTim CallanSofía, while I've got you, you've already covered so much territory, and I'm taking notes here. I got a lot of interest in terms of Certificate Authority, as a Certificate Authority, in order to think through the signing process of a CSR, a Certificate Signing Request. And we know from Bas Westerbaan and just thinking through the fact that a lot of these postquantum algorithms have much larger signature sizes than we've dealt with with RSA or ECC. I happen to know right, IETF working with Bas Westerbaan and others on things like Merkle tree certificates, that project and also another project which you just mentioned, which is a lot of people who listen to this podcast are very interested in ACME. And of course, because the CSR process is part of ACME, you guys, and other reasons, you guys at IETF are actually working on PQC ACME. This whole world around the CSR process large signature sizes and how that cascades to changes that are necessary, this could probably just be a whole episode to itself, but I'd love to hear you categorize what's IETF doing? What's the thinking around that in general? Is it a later project, and what's generally going on to help solve this problem?
For example, one of the proposals of the American tree is also to rethink the way that the certificates are kind of handled in a way that it will be more efficient without having to think so much on the size of the public key. Or, for example, there's another proposal that I have co-authored, which is called KEM-TLS, which, instead of using signatures, use KEMs to arrive to authentication, which is also a way that you could use. There's like other things that you could also use for authentication.
At the moment, we seem to be fixated for signatures, but maybe it turns out that we cannot handle those signatures in the real world, and hence we have to move to other authentication mechanisms. Or it also maybe means that some protocols will not be able to handle. Let's take the case of maybe DNSSEC, and if it turns out that we cannot, like, just completely migrate the signatures of the DNSSEC to a postquantum one, that maybe we'll have to redo the whole DNSSEC protocol. That's also an approach that we could take.
There's like a lot of open avenues. At the moment, they are all stopped because we're only focusing more in the case change part. But it turns out that if, for example, some of the experiments that Amazon is making at the moment, or that Cloudflare is making at the moment, really showed us that the signatures would really make connection chokes that maybe we should think of other authentication mechanisms.
TCTim CallanThis is an important point. I want to make sure that we're communicating this correctly to the listeners. I'm gonna play this back, and I want you to correct me if I'm getting this wrong. You're saying that we're going to try to do authentication with signatures, but we recognize that that may not work, and in the event that it doesn't for some protocols or many possibly, we may actually switch authentication strategies and release standards that use a different strategy for authentication and that that is a possibility.
If you want that to actually become a standard of the IETF, then there's different, because then what you have to actually do is present the proposal and getting it standardized by the IETF. But nothing prevents people from using a code point and an algorithm assign a code point in the infrastructure. It is something that definitely we're keeping in mind, but the IETF independently creates their own opinions. Like it is a point that we take into account, but independently we also decide what the consensus or the different parts of the internet is.
TCTim CallanHonestly, I think CA/Browser Forum I'm expecting will be able to mostly take what IETF hands us and wrap a little bit around it and be ready to go. I'm expecting CA/Browser Forum’s work here to be pretty light, because the heavy lifting, I think, will all be done by IETF. Which is good because CA/Browser Forum is going to want to move fast. I asked that question partly out of interest for the listeners, but partly because I care. I want to know. I’m in CA/Browser Forum. That’s when we pick up the baton and run.
TCTim CallanIs there time for that? Like, the first contest took, how many years? Seven years?
TCTim CallanDo we expect the Onramp to be significantly shorter, because I've always been assuming, and maybe I'm wrong here, and please, correct me if I am - I've been of the impression that we were going to go to market, if you will, with the existing winners and possibly the Round 4 winner and then there would be a future update, if that's the right word, to account for the Onramp. Are you saying that's not the case?
TCTim CallanAre you predicting? I think we should all reconvene to have a separate conversation about the Onramp, because we could spend a whole episode just on that. Are you predicting that we will have Onramp winners in 2025?
TCTim CallanNo. Maybe 2026. But surely we're all not going to sit around until 2026 to figure out our authentication problem.
TCTim CallanNow we've talked a lot about ML-DSA. NIST actually awarded three digital signature algorithms as winners and has at least put out two FIPS standards for those. What about the others?
There's another one that is like, there is one that is based on hashes. It's a hash-based algorithm that was called SPHINX. And I don't remember anymore how NIST is calling that one. I don't remember what's the new name, but it's a SPHINX, and that one, for example, it has been really interesting for other protocols. This has not been discussed at the TLS level, for example, but some people have actually proposed it to use it at the DNSSEC layer, because it has some sizes that are much more amenable to be used in DNSA, but it will mean that you will have to change, in a way, kind of how the DNSSEC protocol works. There's still some discussion if that's the best path forward.
TCTim CallanOkay, got it. That's a lot of work to do, am I correct in thinking that that probably gets settled a little later than, let's say, KEM and TLS, because this is the most critical path item for us to solve?
TCTim CallanWell, we may need to try to get you to come back and just have a whole episode just on that. I think this could go forever. I'm going to ask only one more question, and then Jay, feel free to do whatever you want. Are we still going to be using TLS 1.3? Is it going to have to be a new version of TLS? Is it going to have to be something that we're not even calling TLS? What are we going to do with that?
Then there has been also some people talking about what it will mean for the future of new TLS. One of the things that that proposal will for sure, have to have, is quantum security and some people have also claimed that it will be great to even incorporate the new privacy mechanisms that certain extensions of TLS 1.3 has. Maybe having good mechanisms to check for expirations of certificates or check for if the certificates are included in transparency logs and preserve privacy when you're performing those checks should be considered as well. Those are, like open avenues as well as if we want to think of a new TLS.
TCTim CallanWow. Okay. I think maybe we need to have a conversation about that. Jason, I will certainly hand the forum over to you. Before I do that, I'm going to say, Sofía, I almost feel like you've posed more questions than you've answered with this conversation, and I certainly hope we can coax you into coming back and breaking off some of these other topics and having a nice in depth conversation just on them.
If you have more exposures, for example, in the different regions of the world, how the internet works, because you see certain different types of censorship, because you see internet degradation because the connectivity of the internet is not great, that is also something that the IETF is deeply interested in, and it touches a lot on postquantum cryptography, because the majority of the experiments we have done, we have always done them with the perfect internet conditions. But that's not the whole world. If you have actual experience of when the connectivity of the internet is not great or it's heavily censored, and you're trying to put postquantum cryptography, and you failed, because it makes it even worse, then we would really love to hear that specific perspective. The perspective of the IETF, in my opinion, at the moment, is actually listening more to all of the different cases that the world has.
TCTim CallanAgain, I think we could keep going. I have all sorts of questions popping into my mind, but somewhere along the line, we have to let the listeners get back to their day. Sofía, I really, really hope you come back and talk to us more, because I think there's so much here. We've barely scratched the surface. It's a great introduction to the topic, and with luck, we'll be able to go back and deeper dive. I want to thank you for joining us today. This has been a terrific conversation.