Podcast
Root Causes 427: Mapping CLM to NIST CSF 2.0
Hosted by
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Original broadcast date
October 2, 2024
In this episode we map the contributions of Certificate Lifecycle Management into the new NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.
Podcast transcript
TCTim CallanSo, Jason, we have spoken in the past about CSF 2.0, which is obviously very important. And I think what we want to talk about today is CSF 2.0 and certificate lifecycle management.
TCTim CallanI love it.
So under the protect function, Tim, identity management and access control, Geez, that's kind of a no brainer in that CLM ensures that only authenticated and authorized devices, users and services can access network resources. So think about this as the authentication use case of using certificates. And so therefore certificate lifecycle management is ensuring that not only the life cycle of the cert itself, but also the certificate profile. So in other words, the fundamental, the guts, of all these fancy things you're doing with CSF 2.0, all the controls - think of it almost like a tree, Tim, of technologies, and all the fancy ones you saw at RSA are like the leaves of the tree. All these various controls that you can go off and buy and employ. But what's underneath all of that are going to be credentials and credentials that are being used for the purposes of authentication, strong authentication, And so unless you're using certificate lifecycle to do that, then ultimately the protect function, which is the one that gets the most air time, typically within CSF 2.0, I would say that PKI as a term, but certificate lifecycle management, being a more modern way of thinking about it, is what's truly enabling good protect function in NIST CSF 2.0. Just as a start.
So number two is again from the protect function - data security. So ultimately, the usage of certificates, like, what's a major use case? SSL. The browser to a web server. In other words, from the protect function, data in transit is being protected ultimately by a certificate. And so therefore, certificate lifecycle management is a gigantic enabler of this cybersecurity framework 2.0 basic function. Basic control. When you read CSF 2.0 you don't automatically think certificate lifecycle management, but then you realize, well, the data security part of the protect function in CSF 2.0, if you don't have certificate lifecycle management, you're not employing this. So really, you can cut this part into two pieces. Data in transit. Most data in transit is some sort of TLS-based encryption, and for data that is at rest, you're talking about potentially some sort of life cycle management system of perhaps symmetric keys or other things that you're doing encryption with. But certificates are used in many cases of encryption for data at rest as well. So therefore this entire part of CSF 2.0 maps directly back to CLM.
TCTim CallanSure. I can see that.
TCTim CallanBecause there is a certain fidelity or immutability function that PKI delivers to us. That we know that these things are tamper proof because otherwise they're not going to work.
TCTim CallanIs someone altered a signed document, or if somebody altered a signed blob of code, then the signature wouldn't match, it would fail, and that would be detection of the ruse, the subterfuge.
And I'll go one step further. Remember, those of you who listen to us about encryption, signing and authentication, authentication is really a special case of signing because of the signing of the challenge document. Therefore authentication really is just signing in operation.
TCTim CallanAnd if you think about it that way, you would be possibly detecting an attacker in the middle.
So if you are not aware of your certificate profile - maybe you have certs running around that have a SHA-1 hash function - if you're not aware of that weakness, you are in violation of this guidance.
TCTim CallanSo visibility, and that's also then by that line of reasoning, discoverability comes into this too.
TCTim CallanBecause if I don't know that my certs or my PKIs are going on, then I can't know what they're doing. And if I can't know what they're doing, I can't know that they're secure.
TCTim CallanWell, then it could be used to break sessions without your knowledge. Basically the encryption is forfeit.
TCTim CallanSure.
So, therefore CLM really plays a really key role here in that from visibility to issuance, to all right, if I have a key compromise that I have detected, then I need, through CSF 2.0 a way to be able to mitigate that compromised. Therefore, if I'm not using CLM, I don't have a quick way to do revocation.
TCTim CallanAnd even also, I would say that policy and process integration, from the perspective of this is what I've decided I will deem to be acceptable for PKI, and this is not, you now have a reliable, repeatable, measurable, viewable method of ensuring that you followed these choices that you made. These policy choices.
So, Tim, the next one here - accountability and ownership. So following from the process integration into governance, what about accountability and ownership? Who revoked? When did they revoke? When did this get issued?
TCTim CallanWhere did these certs come from? What are these certs I never heard of before, and who's going to ensure that they get renewed?
TCTim CallanIt’s all over it, isn’t it?
TCTim CallanAnd is that encryption going to be modern? Is that encryption going to be secure and solid? Is it going to be reliable? And how do you know all of that? You set those rules, you govern those rules. They make sure that's the case. You get reports. You confirm. You find outliers. All of that is what CLM does for you.
TCTim CallanAnd so let me now get just a little philosophical on this. I think that's really great to look at it point by point and prove that, and I think you proved it very effectively. I also think that an argument could be made that that's not at all surprising, and the reason for that is because PKI is so foundational to all of our digital processes that you ultimately can't make a framework like this that isn't absurd, that doesn't have PKI just everywhere you turn, and so that should be an expected outcome of a properly run process that gives us this document.
TCTim CallanIt totally could. Absolutely. For sure.
TCTim CallanIt’s what we always run into. It's like water.
And this is really what we're trying to decide here. And you're obviously right in saying, it almost seems obvious once it's said, but since this is the Toronto sessions, we're doing things real polite here. And you said the true part out loud, which is, once you look at it, it's completely obvious that you can't do CSF 2.0 without CLM.
TCTim CallanYou can't. I agree. I think you're right.
TCTim CallanAll right. Well, thank you, Jason.
TCTim CallanThis has been Root Causes.