Podcast
Root Causes 373: Massive Brand Hijack Subverts More Than 21,000 Domains and Subdomains
Hosted by
Jason Soroko
Fellow
Original broadcast date
March 29, 2024
A massive name space attack has hijacked more than 21,000 domains and subdomains, including a who's who list of major global brands. This huge and innovative attack takes advantage of inherited trust in abandoned domains. We explain what is happening.
Podcast transcript
Lightly edited for flow and brevity.
TCTim CallanOkay, so this is a news item that is all over the news. You can read about it in pretty much any place that covers computer press so I'm not going to point you at a specific article. But there recently has been information released by a company called Guardio Labs. They talk about a massive domain hijacking attack that involves more than 8000 domain names and more than 13,000 subdomains, and this is an attack called ResurrecADS. R-e-s-u-r-r-e-c-A-D-S. So Jason, what's going on here?
TCTim CallanYeah.
So Tim, there's an expansion to the story. And by the way, let’s start quoting the numbers here of the numbers of domains and subdomains being affected here, right. 8000s domains and 13,000 subdomains and I bet you, Tim, that's just the beginning, to be honest.
TCTim CallanSure. And they rattle off a bunch. I mean, it's a bunch of huge brands. Here's a list I have in front of me, the ACLU, eBay, Lacoste, Marvel, McAfee, MSN, Pearson, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Swatch, Symantec, The Economist, UNICEF and VMware. And that's just some of them.
TCTim CallanYeah. With that number, it has to be.
So, the bad guys have figured out one step further. It's not just hey, I'm gonna set up a subdomain against the economist, and therefore I'm going to set up a phishing attack let’s say. It goes beyond that because now these attackers have figured out that there is a lot of trust inheritance between domains and subdomains, Tim. In fact, let me quote directly from one of the articles I'm reading here, that says – and this is from The Hacker News. “In particular, the campaign leverages the trust associated with these domains to circulate spam and malicious phishing emails by the millions each day cunningly using their credibility and stolen resources to slip past security measures.” What security measures are we talking about? Well, Tim, its SPF, right?
TCTim CallanRight.
TCTim CallanSure.
TCTim CallanAnd DMARC.
TCTim CallanSo what DMARC and this framework allows you to do is you can pick a certain set of senders that are allowed to work on these particular domains but if I can take over that subdomain, I basically can circumvent that whole thing by being a legitimate official domain, right? And, or by becoming a sender that DMARC allows, right? That's the other way that I can do it. So it can be an email that will pass through DMARC that will appear to come from your domain name because I took over the source that DMARC has already said is allowed to be a sender.
TCTim CallanOkay.
TCTim CallanRight. Sure. And it just sat there.
TCTim CallanIt is. And another thing that I find is interesting, Jason, is oftentimes white hats, and sort of the security minded purveyors of information of which we’re just a minor example sometimes they're out ahead of the threats, right. So you and I were talking about harvest and decrypt and PQC long before we think that was really going on, by way of example. We think it's going on now, but I don't think it was going on four years ago and we were discussing it then. This one, fascinatingly, has emerged as a part of the dialogue very recently. Like a year ago, nobody was talking about this. Six months ago, nobody was really talking about this. It has emerged very recently as part of the dialogue about what's going on in the world of security and yet, now we are watching this massive attack. That's a real life attack. It's not hypothetical. And so in that way, right, it's different from let's say, BGP attacks, and DCV circumvention, which is definitely identified as a risk, right? You and I have podcasted on that in the past. Identified as a risk and steps are being taken to prevent that from becoming a real thing. And there's no reason to believe that that's happening at any kind of scale today. We just want to make sure it doesn't. In this case, this is happening at scale today, right?
TCTim CallanThis is not tomorrow's problem. This is yesterday's and today's problem.
TCTim CallanSure.
TCTim CallanYep.
TCTim CallanAnd I looked at the header, and indeed it came from the real domain name, right. We know we can't trust from addresses, but we can see where it really came from. I looked at it was right. And along the same lines, right, is if I wind up getting plunked on a page somewhere, check the domain of that page and you're go, nope, that's the real thing. Absolutely. And that's what's so treacherous about this is that, you know, and you and I just discussed this in our episode, I think it was 365. Is that right? Yes. 365. And exactly that. The fact is that all of us for our entire adult lives have been trained to look at the domain name. It is second nature. It is something like so basic. If someone doesn't know that you think they must be a baby and now it turns out that that doesn't necessarily do the job. And that's a mind blower and that's a conundrum.
Number one, there are vendors right now that will help you to enumerate your problem because we've now figured out how the bad guy is doing this and what you should do is look at your own dangling DNS problem. Just do it. Okay? There are vendors out there, just - - I'm not a salesperson, so I'm not gonna name the names, but there it is. Go find a vendor and look at it. What I think is eventually gonna have to happen, Tim, is the public clouds, and the hosting people who are out there are gonna have to offer some help.
TCTim CallanYeah.
TCTim CallanRight.
TCTim CallanOr you wonder if there can be some kind of automatic cleanup put in place where you could set an expiration. Like if I'm gonna run a campaign. So like, if you talk about something like marthastewartssweeps, right, that sounds to me like a marketing site that is going to be used for a limited period of time, and then that's going to be done. So you know, could the tooling be in place where I'm going to set a time limit and I'm going to say, expire this after a year, or after six months, or after nine months, just shut it down, and go do it automatically. And do it in a predictable way where there won't be any errors or won't be forgotten.
You know, in a lot of ways this feels to me just like, you know, we talked about certificate management all the time, right. The reason that people have these outages is because there's some action that has to be taken and it doesn't get taken. And you got something similar here, like, in a perfect world where everybody cleaned up after themselves, this wouldn't be an issue, but people don't clean up after themselves. But you could start to imagine where tooling would help that. When I set it up, I could say this is going to expire in six months, and then the software could go clean it up for me. Now, that could be an aftermarket platform. That could be something that's just sitting in your public cloud tooling. There's various ways that that could be delivered. But it feels to me like that is a valuable function that we're really almost entirely lacking today.
You know, in a lot of ways this feels to me just like, you know, we talked about certificate management all the time, right. The reason that people have these outages is because there's some action that has to be taken and it doesn't get taken. And you got something similar here, like, in a perfect world where everybody cleaned up after themselves, this wouldn't be an issue, but people don't clean up after themselves. But you could start to imagine where tooling would help that. When I set it up, I could say this is going to expire in six months, and then the software could go clean it up for me. Now, that could be an aftermarket platform. That could be something that's just sitting in your public cloud tooling. There's various ways that that could be delivered. But it feels to me like that is a valuable function that we're really almost entirely lacking today.
I think that we'll get there. We're gonna have to get there because this is too big of a problem. What I will say, though, my take on what you just said is, it's going to be a hybrid. You're gonna have to have human eyes evaluating and then you can click a button and have things automated quickly. But you know, look public cloud.
TCTim CallanWell, and you’ll probably have a mix, right? It'll depend on use case, and it will depend on your level of confidence. Like if I'm running a campaign, and it's going to be done in 90 days, and I know that, then why wouldn't I have something that just automatically blows everything up in six months.
TCTim CallanSure. Right. But yes, you're right. Like we're talking about something that was established in 2001. Right? So all that old stuff is going to have to get looked at and cleaned up too and you're right, that's going to be tough. But there might be ways that tooling could help with that, right? Maybe you could look at activity. Maybe there would be other markers or qualities you could use to flag things as things that are likely okay to clean up or likely still in production. Like there's ways that you could approach this, I think.
TCTim CallanBecause we are interested.
TCTim CallanAbsolutely. Right. TLS certificates and domains are yin and yang. They’re inseparable. They completely affect each other. Their lives are intertwined to the point, and you and I've talked about this in the past too, where we consider it fair game to discuss important things in the world of domains and domaining because they directly, they affect certificates and vice versa. And I think this is just a huge story in the world of domains that you and I couldn't ignore.
TCTim CallanThere you go. Thank you, Jason. I am certain we're going to return to the story again.
TCTim CallanThank you very much. This has been Root Causes.