Resource Library

The PLANTS working group in IETF recently released its draft 6 of the Merkle Tree Certificates standard. We go over what is new in this draft.

Apple has announced it will support Merkle Tree Certificates for PQC and has released a draft root store policy. We share some of the surprising requirements in this draft.

Learn how NIST PQC standards, CA/B Forum certificate lifespan changes, and federal timelines are reshaping cryptography and certificate management.

The NIST contest has not been the only government-led effort to discover qunatum-resistant algorithms. In this episode we describe South Korea's PQC contest, which is entirely independent of the NIST contest.

In this second of two episodes, we finish our discussion of Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computers (SRQC) and their implications.

Sectigo Quantum Ready™ helps enterprises discover cryptographic exposure and build a foundation for post-quantum readiness and crypto agility.

In this first of two episodes, we discuss the expected scientific applications for quantum computing architecture and the idea of a Scientifically Relevant Quantum Computer (SRQC).

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is supposed to be this highly secure method of key exchange. But is it as secure as people say? We explore the potential weaknesses with QKD.

We follow up on the recent Mythos attack against PQC candidate HAWK. We discuss the impact of this attack on both HAWK and FALCON.

TLS certificates from CA/Browser Forum CAs are not the only server certificates in the WebPKI. eIDAS QWACs are treated as server certificates by the major browsers. We see clear progress toward post quantum cryptography (PQC) for TLS by way of the Merkle Tree Certificate (MTC) architecture. But what is the path to PQC for eIDAS? We examine this question.

We are replacing RSA with the combination of ML-DSA and ML-KEM. We explain the naming convention and specifically what these two algorithms do.

Jason explains de-quantization, which is the practice of using our knowledge of how to use a quantum computer to reframe problems for processing using traditional computing architecture.

Anthropic recently announced that Mythos has found mathematical weakness in the core algorithm for the third-round NIST PQC candidate HAWK, effectively halving its effective key strength. Mythos also developed a faster attack on a round-reduced version of AES-128. These are not implementation attacks but mathematical attacks on the core cryptography. We discuss the massive implications of these developments.

MTCs reduce PQC overhead using compact proofs, enabling fast, transparent, and scalable post-quantum certificate authentication.

Dustin Moody of NIST joins us to talk about the evolution of standardized cryptography beyond the current PQC efforts. Topics include maintaining visibility on cryptography presently in use, 50 years of RSA, and cryptographic heterogeny.

Bas Westerbaan of Cloudflare joins us to discuss recent information that heightens concerns about Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and its vulnerability to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC). We pose the question do we need to deprecate ECC in advance of our migration to ML-DSA and other PQC algorithms.

U.S. shifts PQC deadline to 2031, prioritizing key establishment to address HNDL risks and accelerate enterprise crypto readiness.

A new Executive Order (EO) moves the deadline for ML-DSA deployment up to 2031. We talk about why this happened and its implications on government, the technology industry, and enterprises around the globe.