Ressources

There is no CABF or root program rule preventing public CAs from implementing new requirements earlier than their assigned due dates. We discuss reasons to implement a rule early and how early it should be.

SSL hasn't been a standard in use for nearly thirty years, but we still use the word. We discuss why that is, what else we might say, and the expected effect of Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) on our technical vocabulary.

With the upcoming deprecation of client authentication using publicly trusted TLS certificates, we go over the common use cases for these certificates. We discuss the reasons public trust is often chosen and how to transition away from it.

Because of a change in the drop-dead date, we have observed confusion about the timeline for deprecation of client authentication and mTLS for public TLS certificates. This is an inflexible deadline, and enterprises that are not ready risk outage. In this episode we spell out these dates very clearly.

2024 saw a flurry of high profile incidents for public CA, which we named the Bugzilla Bloodbath. We look back to see how the WebPKI has changed as a consequence.

TLS 1.3 is required to take advantage of post quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Yes, we still see a lot of TLS 1.2 or earlier in deployment. We examine why this is the case and what to do about it.

Recent announcements from Google and Cloudflare have declared new 2029 deadlines for full post quantum cryptography (PQC) migration. Bas Westerbaan explains the rationale behind Cloudflare's decision and discusses implications for other enterprises., asking "Are you a gambler?"

Dustin Moody of NIST joins us to discuss Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs) and the NIST position on them.

Repeat guest Bas Westerbaan of Cloudflare joins us to explain the PLANTS working group in IETF, which is driving standards around post quantum cryptography (PQC) and Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC). Bas explains the path to becoming a final standard, where we are in this process, and how you can get involved.

It's reasonable to believe that Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) and traditional RSA will co-exist on the same servers for years, if not decades, during the transition to post quantum cryptography (PQC). Bas Westerbaan of Cloudflare joins us in this episode to explore the possibility of quantum downgrade attacks and what we can do about them.

We are joined by Bas Westerbaan of Cloudflare to explain considerations and requirements for use of Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs). This includes full adoption of TLS 1.3, offering PQC and RSA at the same time, the imperative value of automation, and running production MTC in 2027.

Google has taken a strong position supporting Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) as the PQC-enabled future for SSL / TLS.

Les certificats d’une durée de 398 jours sont passés à 200 jours le 15 mars. Automatisez dès maintenant la gestion du cycle de vie des certificats (CLM) sous peine de subir des interruptions de service, un surmenage et des risques de non-conformité.

Découvrez les différents types de certificats SSL : validation étendue (EV), validation d'organisation (OV) et validation de domaine (DV). Voir les cas d'utilisation, les variations, et plus encore.